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ABSTRACT 
On March 24th, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, declaring, “everybody should have some basic security 
when it comes to their health care.” This Note provides a comprehensive 
examination of this complex legislation. Second, it reframes the bill by proposing 
that its miscellaneous-seeming provisions are designed to protect a single, central 
provision: the ban on health discrimination. Finally, it argues that underlying 
economic forces will likely cause PPACA to do more harm than good. While 
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On March 24th, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law H.R. 
3590,
1
 the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), declaring 
that “everybody should have some basic security when it comes to their 
health care.”2 Lauded as “the most expansive social legislation enacted in 
decades,”3 PPACA, and its companion bill, the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA)
4
 are tremendously lengthy and 
complex bills
5
 aimed at accomplishing a variety of social purposes. In a 
September 2009 address before Congress, President Obama argued that 
health care had become unaffordably costly
6
 and that too many Americans 
were uninsured.
7
 Most vivid in the President‟s speech, however, was the 
need for security and stability in the face of objectionable insurance 
industry practices: 
One man from Illinois lost his coverage in the middle of chemotherapy 
because his insurer found that he hadn't reported gallstones that he didn't 
even know about. They delayed his treatment, and he died because of it. 
Another woman from Texas was about to get a double mastectomy 
when her insurance company canceled her policy because she forgot to 
declare a case of acne. By the time she had her insurance reinstated, her 
breast cancer had more than doubled in size. That is heart-breaking, it is 
wrong, and no one should be treated that way in the United States of 
 
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010) 
[hereinafter PPACA].  
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Into 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A1. 
3. Id. 
4. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152 (signed 
by President Obama on March 30, 2010) [hereinafter HCERA]. See William Branigin, 
Obama Signs Higher-Education Measure into Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2010, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/03/obama-signs-higher-education-m.html. 
5. PPACA itself totals 2409 pages. See PPACA. HCERA is an additional 153 pages, 
for a total of 2562. See HCERA. 
6. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to a Joint Session of Congress 
on Health Care, (Sept. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-by-the-president-to-a-joint-session-
of-congress-on-health-care (last visited Apr. 12, 2010). 
7. Id. 






The above examples were meant to illustrate the President‟s main 
point of contention: that the insurance industry currently discriminates 
against the sick and the unhealthy—using even trivial matters to deny 
coverage.
9
 This is not a new complaint,
10
 and the President has described 
the need to regulate insurance companies, who “treat their customers 
badly—by cherry-picking the healthiest individuals and trying to drop the 
sickest, by overcharging small businesses who have no leverage, and by 
jacking up rates.”11 
The President further argued that the reform proposal—the proposal 
that would eventually evolve into the PPACA—could solve these 
problems, saying: 
Now is the time to deliver on health care. The plan I'm announcing 
tonight would meet three basic goals. It will provide more security and 
stability to those who have health insurance. It will provide insurance 
for those who don't. And it will slow the growth of health care costs for 
our families, our businesses, and our government.
12
 
For its part, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) largely agreed 
with President Obama‟s predictions. It estimated that PPACA would 
reduce federal deficits by $143 billion from 2010-2019, of which $124 
billion would be directly related to health reform.
13
 CBO also estimated 
that the bill would help reduce the ranks of the nonelderly uninsured by 32 
million, from about 17% to about 6%.
14
 At a first glance, it seems that 
PPACA is well on its way to accomplishing its goals. 




10. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health 
Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73 (2005). 
11. See Obama, supra note 6. 
12. Id. 
13. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Letter to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi 
Providing an Analysis of the Reconciliation Proposal, (Mar. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/Manager%27sAmendmenttoReconciliation
Proposal.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) (the remainder of the reduction came from the 
bill‟s changes to student loans and CBO‟s projected changes to Social Security, the Postal 
Service, and other elements). 
14. Id. 
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contributing to the literature in a specific way. PPACA and HCERA are 
tremendously detailed pieces of legislation and have been the subjects of 
extraordinary confusion. Legal scholarship will play a role in definitively 
dispelling many of the myths that have arisen around this landmark 
legislation, and Part I of this Note serves to provide a broad review of 
these highly complex statutes. This lays a foundation for analysis, but is 
also a crucial contribution in its own right. 
In order to evaluate the reform bill, we must next define its intentions. 
In Part II, I propose a conceptual understanding of PPACA‟s design: 
specifically, I argue that the central provision of the bill is the ban on 
health status discrimination. Each of the other major components of the 
bill—the mandate, the subsidy, and the revenue provisions—is designed to 
ameliorate the market interference of this core regulation. This Note 
examines each component of the health reform bill accompanied by a 
review of the underlying legal and health policy scholarship—and thus 
aims to lay a foundation for future analysis. 
Finally, Part III assembles the available evidence to argue that 
PPACA, despite its admirable intentions, is unlikely to accomplish its 
goals. PPACA has been subject to wide-ranging criticism, but this Note 
systematically organizes economic projections, including CBO‟s, to 
demonstrate that the underlying math simply will not yield to legislative 
intentions. It appears that the bill probably will not eliminate insurer 
discrimination; may exacerbate rather than alleviate medical deprivation; 
and will almost certainly not result in reduced federal deficits. Most 
frighteningly, Part III.B examines the bill‟s methods for preventing the 
unraveling of health insurance—and concludes that they are almost 
certainly inadequate because the costs of health insurance are likely to rise 
dramatically. PPACA, if it proceeds as expected, will almost certainly be a 
self-defeating piece of legislation. 
This pessimism is not by any means set in stone, as the federal 
government still has many decisions remaining. The insurance industry‟s 
choices will also matter, and so will the choices of millions of ordinary 
Americans. Health reform may ultimately prove successful—but, for now, 
the nation has good reason to be highly concerned. 
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I. FOUR COMPONENTS 
A. Insurance Regulation 
President Obama‟s address to Congress highlighted a series of 
egregious industry behaviors with a particular focus on rescission—the 
practice of withdrawing a policyholder‟s insurance coverage, sometimes 
for seemingly trivial reasons. And rescission is not a particularly rare 
practice: a House Energy and Commerce Committee investigation found 
that just three insurance companies had rescinded 19,776 policies over 
five years, saving themselves $300 million.
15
 The President‟s address 
demanded that such behavior be outlawed, and, accordingly, the bill itself 
commences with several prohibitions on insurer discrimination against the 
unhealthy. 
First, PPACA imposes guaranteed issue, stating: “each health 
insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual or 
group market in a State must accept every employer and individual in the 
State that applies for such coverage.”16 All applicants, even those with 
preexisting illnesses, must be accepted. 
As a logical extension of guaranteed issue, PPACA prohibits 
rescission.
17
 Unless policyholders commit actual fraud, the bill demands 
that insurers grant continuing coverage and a guarantee of renewability.
18
 
Congress specifically prohibits discrimination based on “health status-
related factors,” and it proceeds to define this term in every conceivable 
way: health status, medical condition, claims experience, receipt of health 
care, medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, 
disability, and any other health status-related factor, as determined by the 
Secretary for Health and Human Services (HHS).
19
 
These regulations, of course, would be useless without accompanying 
rate regulation—otherwise, insurers could simply price ill individuals out 
of the market. The plan thus prohibits rate discrimination based on health 
 
15. Joanne Silberner, Insurers Revoke Policies to Avoid Paying High Costs, NPR, 
June 22, 2009, available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105680875 (last visited Apr. 12, 
2010). 
16. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201 (2010). 
17. Id. § 1001. 
18. Id. § 1201. 
19. Id. 





 It permits premiums to vary “only by”: 1) whether the plan is 
meant for individuals or families, 2) geography, 3) age, and 4) tobacco 
use.
21
 The obvious omission is health status, and this is crucial enough that 
PPACA repeats itself almost immediately: “such rate shall not vary with 
respect to the particular plan or coverage involved by any other factor not 




This new regulations already represent a landmark change in the way 
that health insurance currently operates—and even these four permitted 
categories come with additional restrictions. 
First, insurance plans are permitted only to regard the binary status of 
individual or family—they may not charge different rates based on the size 
of a family. 
Second, geographic units are at the discretion of the states (subject to 
veto by HHS),
24
 and geographic discrimination could ultimately be limited 
to state-by-state rates.
25
 It will be legal to charge different rates, for 
example, to Texans compared to Californians, but the state of California 
could prohibit charging different premiums to residents of downtown 
Oakland as compared to residents of Beverly Hills. Any state which 
governs either too tightly or too loosely is subject to being overruled by 
HHS. 
Third, age discrimination is permitted, but only up to a 3:1 ratio. 
Current national ratios are 4.26:1 when comparing an eighteen year old to 
a sixty-four year old,
26
 and so PPACA appears to mandate at least a 42% 
increase in relative premiums for young policyholders—a non-trivial 
increase. And this is already an underestimate, since the 4.26:1 ratio does 





23. Id. § 2716. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. See America‟s Health Insurance Plans, Individual Health Insurance 5, Oct. 2009, 
available at 
http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/2009IndividualMarketSurveyFinalReport.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2010) (indicating that the average annual premium was $1,350 for an 
individual policyholder under 18, but $5,755 for somebody 60-64). 
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HHS approval, but tentatively the truly elderly do appear to be included.
27
 
Fourth, smokers can be charged higher rates, with a maximum 
differential of 1.5 to 1. This is not a general “unhealthy behavior 
premium”—it applies specifically to tobacco use.28 It says nothing about 
other substance abuse, risky sexual practices, unhealthy eating or exercise 
habits, or medication compliance. And a smoker—even one with a history 
of cardiac arrest or lung cancer—may be charged no more than 150% of 
the premium imposed on his non-smoking, healthy counterpart. 
The bill also includes a variety of other insurance reforms. To 
highlight just a few, insurance plans must: cover preventive care;
29
 cover 
dependents until age twenty-six;
30
 have no annual or lifetime coverage 
limits;
31
 and cap out-of-pocket spending at $2,250 (adjusted for 
inflation).
32
 Insurers must spend at least 80% of revenue from premiums 
on incurred claims losses.
33
 Even this list is not all-inclusive.
34
  
The core element of the bill, however, remains the non-discrimination 
regulation. In short, insurers‟ ability to screen their patients—to “cherry-
pick”35—has been dramatically curtailed. This is, of course, precisely the 
goal of the PPACA,
36
 and the importance of this regulation cannot be 
overstated. Each of PPACA‟s other components is a natural extension of 
this one. 
 
27. PPACA § 1201. 
28. At least one Internet commentator had worried that the bill provided a general 
“unhealthy behavior premium,” which insurance companies could exploit. See mcjoan, 
How Insurers Can Game the New System, DAILY KOS, Apr. 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2010/4/1/853166/-How-Insurers-Can-Game-the-
New-System (last visited Apr. 12, 2010). This particular argument is incorrect, see 
PPACA § 1201, and most of the article‟s other concerns are not new complaints. 
29. PPACA § 1001. 
30. Id. 
31. Id., modified by § 10101(a). 
32. PPACA § 1302(c)(1); I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii). The limit is $4,500 for a family 
insurance plan. I.R.C. §§ 223(c)(2)(B)(ii). 
33. HCERA, Pub. L. 111-152, § 10101(f) (2010). The required “medical loss ratio” 
is 85% in the large group market. Id. 
34. Additional requirements for a minimum plan appear in PPACA § 1302(b)(1). See 
infra text accompanying note 43 (describing qualifying minimum plans) and note 46 
(describing requirement that all plans be “comprehensive”). 
35. See Obama, supra note 6. 
36. Id. 
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B. The Mandate 
Additionally, PPACA requires all individuals to either possess an 
insurance policy or pay a fine
37
 in the form of a new tax which will be 
waived if the taxpayer can prove that he or she is insured. 
The tax scales up over time, reaching its peak in 2015 and thereafter. 
At that time, it will amount to the greater of $695 or 2.5% of the 
taxpayer‟s income in excess of the threshold amount at which a tax return 
is required.
38
 This is generally greater than the fine in the original Senate 
bill, which would have been $750.
39
 PPACA‟s actual fine would be 
$2,500, for example, for an individual making $109,350 a year, or for a 
family making $118,700 a year. The fine would be paid as part of a tax 
return,
40
 and is codified as part of the Internal Revenue Code.
41
 It will 
depend on the IRS for implementation and enforcement.  
The mandate levies that fine against any individual who is not 
“covered under minimum essential coverage” for any single month.42 
“Minimum essential coverage,” however, is not defined by PPACA 
itself—instead, Congress delegates that authority to HHS.43 The statute 
does impose substantial requirements as components of any minimum 
plan: it must include ambulatory servies, emergency services, 
hospitalization, maternity care, mental health and substance abuse 
services, prescription drugs, rehabilitation, laboratory testing, preventive 
care, and pediatric services—even for patients who could not conceivably 
use such services.
44
 Additionally, several general insurance regulations 
will also serve de facto as part of the floor.
45
 Nonetheless, HHS will retain 
 
37. PPACA § 1501, modified by § 10106; amended by HCERA § 1002. 
38. PPACA § 1501, modified by § 10106; amended by HCERA § 1002.The 
minimum amount seems to be $2,000. See I.R.C. § 6012(a)(1) and § 151(d)(1) (indicating 
that no return needs to be filed for incomes below the exemption amount, and that that 
exemption amount is $2,000, respectively, adjusted for inflation since 1989). See Internal 
Revenue Service, 1040 Instructions 2009, 8, chart A, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/i1040.pdf (listing updated threshold amounts). 
39. PPACA § 1501(c), modified by § 10106; amended by HCERA § 1002. 
40. PPACA § 1501(b)(2). 
41. Id. § 1501(b). 
42. Id. § 1501(a). 
43. Id. § 1302(b). 
44. Id. § 1302(b)(1). All plans, for example, must cover maternity care, with no 
exception for male policyholders. Id.  
45. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33. 
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considerable room to operate. It will not be allowed to determine 
premiums—although it will have authority to review future rate 
increases
46—but it will nonetheless have the authority to declare that all 
plans must meet certain minimum standards.
47
 
Importantly, the mandate fine also contains a hardship exemption: no 
fine shall be imposed if the cheapest plan that would satisfy the mandate 
would charge premiums greater than 8% of an individual‟s income.48 (It 
also contains a religious exemption.)
49
 Depending on how the insurance 
market reacts—and exactly what the mandate includes50—this hardship 
exemption could potentially apply to a large number of families. HHS has 
the authority to revise that 8% threshold in accordance with the excess of 
the rate of premium growth compared to the rate of income growth.
51
 The 
language of the bill appears to presume, probably correctly,
52
 that the 8% 
hardship exemption can be raised, but never lowered. 
Among other provisions, the individual mandate has been challenged 
on constitutional grounds.
53
 The constitutional merits of these lawsuits are 
beyond the scope of this paper, but Congressional findings—inserted 
precisely into this section,
54
 perhaps anticipating challenges—appear to 
 
46. PPACA § 1003. 
47. Id. § 1302(b). See also id. § 1201 (requiring all health insurers to provide 
comprehensive coverage, effectively outlawing any new issuances of a “catastrophic” 
plan except in specific situations); id. at § 10902 (limiting payments to health flexible 
spending arrangements). The bill does permit what it refers to as a “catastrophic” plan 
which treats the out-of-pocket cap as a deductible. This plan also requires three primary 
care visits to be included and restricts eligibility to the individual market for those who 
are under 30 or for whom the hardship exemption (see infra text accompanying note 48) 
applies. Id. § 1302(e). 
48. Id. § 1501(b). 
49. Id., referencing § 1311(d)(4)(H). 
50. See infra Part III.B. 
51. PPACA § 1501(b). 
52. See Christopher J. Truffer et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2019: The 
Recession’s Impact Continues, 29 HEALTH AFF. 522, 526 (2010) (explaining that 
health spending is likely to continue rising faster than income). 
53. Complaint, State of Florida vs. United States Department of Health and Human 
Services (N.D.Fl. 2010) (No. 3:10 Civ. 91), available at 
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/MRAY-
83TKWB/$file/HealthCareReformLawsuit.pdf. 
54. See PPACA § 1501(a) (declaring that the bill is constitutional under Commere 
Clause authority).  
 ADVERSE REACTIONS 
11 
 
place the statute firmly within Congress‟s Article I authority.55 
In addition to the individual mandate, Congress also imposed 
incentives for employers to provide their employees with health insurance. 
First, employers with more than fifty employees must either offer 
coverage to each employee or pay a fee of $2,000 per year for each 
employee beyond the first thirty.
56
 That is, a firm which employs 130 
employees must pay $200,000—provided that any one of these employees 
receive a subsidy, as described below.
57
 If those employers do provide 
health insurance to only some employees, the fee rises to $3,000 per 
employee beyond the first thirty if any employee receives a subsidy.
58
 
Presumably, the higher fee is designed to penalize employers who provide 
coverage for some, but not all, employees. Congress also imposed voucher 
requirements for employers
59
 and substantial tax incentives for small 
businesses
60—but at its core, the mandate is simple: individuals, whether 
healthy or sick, are required to have health insurance. If their employers 
do not provide it, then they must do so themselves. 
C. Subsidies 
The bill also provides two kinds of subsidies: one to assist in the 
 
55. See U.S. CONST. art I., § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate 
commerce . . . among the several States”). See also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Bill 
Lawsuits Are Going Nowhere, CNN.COM, Mar. 24, 2010, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/03/24/jost.health.bill.challenges/index.html; Jack 
Balkin, A Tax Like Any Other, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2010, available at 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/is-the-health-care-law-
unconstitutional (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (“The individual mandate . . . is a tax on 
behavior, like a tax on businesses that don‟t install anti-pollution equipment.”); Jacob 
Hacker, Professor of Political Science, Yale Univ., Address to Yale Law School 
American Constitution Society: What‟s Next? Implementing and Expanding the Health 
Care Law (Apr. 8, 2010) (characterizing the mandate as a tax). 
56. PPACA § 1513(a), amended by HCERA, Pub. L. 111-152, § 1003(b)(2) (2010). 
57. See infra Part I.C. Presumably, any business at which no employee has a low 
enough income to qualify for the subsidy would not pay any fines. PPACA § 1513(a), 
amended by HCERA § 1003(b)(2) (2010). 
58. PPACA § 1513(c), amended by HCERA § 1003(b)(1). 
59. Specifically, Employers who offer coverage are also required to offer vouchers 
equivalent to their usual contribution to any employee for whom the required employee 
contribution would be between 8.0% and 9.8% of income. Id. at § 10108. These vouchers 
would be usable in an Exchange, for which details can be found in Part I(D), infra. 
60. PPACA § 1421, modified by § 10105(e). 
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payment of insurance premiums, and one to assist in cost-sharing.  
First, federal tax credits provide premium assistance for families 
which fall beneath certain income thresholds and which do not receive 
employer-provided insurance.
61
 The bill provides a scaled subsidy 
structured to ensure that no family pays more than a certain percentage of 
its income towards health insurance premiums. These percentages are 
based on the Federal Poverty Line (FPL),
62
 such that taxpayers would pay 




   Table 1: Premium Subsidy
64
 
Income Maximum Premium Contribution 
Up to 133% of FPL 2% of income 
133-150% FPL 3-4% of income 
150-200% FPL 4-6.3% of income 
200-250% FPL 6.3-8.05% of income 
250-300% FPL 8.05-9.5% of income 
300-400% FPL 9.5% of income 
In other words, the subsidy is not a flat fee; it is properly understood 
as an effective cap on health insurance premiums. It functions on a linear 
sliding scale,
65
 except that it appears to cut off suddenly after 400% FPL;
66
 
perhaps Congress believed that the price of health insurance would be less 
than these caps anyway, alleviating the transition. The subsidy is 
scheduled to be adjusted based on premium growth over and above 
general income growth,
67
 with additional adjustments in the event of 
particularly large increases in government expenditures on PPACA and 
HCERA subsidies. 
Second, the bill also provides subsidies meant to reduce “cost-
sharing” provisions such as deductibles and co-pays. The government will 
 
61. Id. § 1401. 
62. The Federal Poverty Line is determined by the Office of Management and 
Budget based on U.S. Census data, and modified by HHS. 42 U.S.C. 9902(2). 
63. The “silver” plan is a plan that gets included at the second tier in State 
exchanges. See infra Part I.E. 
64. HCERA, Pub. L. 111-152, § 1001(a)(1)(A) (2010). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. § 1001(a)(1)(B)(I). 
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refund credits equivalent to the following amounts of incurred cost-
sharing: 
     Table 2: Cost-Sharing Subsidy
68
 




150-200% FPL 87% 
200-250% FPL 73% 
250-400% FPL 70% 
 
In 2010, the Federal Poverty Line was set at $10,830 for an individual, 
or $22,050 for a family of four.
70
 Subsidies are provided, therefore, until 
an individual makes $43,320 and until a family of four has income of 
$88,200. 
D. Cost-Reducing and Revenue-Generating Provisions 
PPACA also contains several provisions designed to generate revenue 
for and to reduce medical spending by the federal government. Roughly, 
they fall into three categories: 1) tax increases and new taxes, 2) direct 
spending reductions, and 3) pro-competitive arrangements. 
First, PPACA contains several tax increases. Most obviously, the fines 
from the individual
71
 and employer mandates
72
 will generate some 
revenue. The bill also imposes a 40% excise tax—often referred to as the 
“Cadillac tax”73—on the value of any employer-sponsored insurance plan 
 
68. Id. § 1001(b). 
69. Those beneath 100% FPL are Medicaid-eligible. See infra text accompanying 
note 128.  
70. 74 Fed. Reg. 4199-4201 (Jan. 23, 2009) (setting FPL thresholds as described). 
HHS‟s usual adherence to inflation measures would have lowered the 2010 levels. See 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Extension of 2009 Poverty Guidelines 
Until at Least March 31, 2010, available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/09extension.shtml. Accordingly, Congress took action to 
keep the 2009 FPL guidelines in place. See Pub. L. 111-118 (“the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services shall not publish updated poverty guidelins for 2010”). 
71. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501 (2010), modified by § 10106; amended by 
HCERA, Pub. L. 111-152, § 1002 (2010). 
72. PPACA § 1513(a), amended by HCERA § 1003(b)(2); id. § 1513(c), amended by 
HCERA § 1003(b)(1). 
73. Editorial, Will President Obama Defend the Cadillac Tax to Cut Health-Care 
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that exceeds annual values of $10,200 for an individual or $27,500 for a 
family, as adjusted for 2018
74
 based on the increase in the costs of health 
insurance for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan (commonly 
known as FEHBP).
75
 Thereafter, adjustments will be based on general 
consumer inflation plus 1%.
76
 The bill also imposes additional income 
taxes: filers who make over $200,000 ($250,000 for a married couple) will 
face an additional 0.9% payroll tax over that threshold.
77
 They will also 
face a new 3.8% surtax on net investment income or adjusted gross 
income over the threshold, whichever is less.
78
 
The bill also imposes a variety of new industry taxes: $27 billion over 
ten years in pharmaceutical industry fees,
79
 2.3% excise taxes on medical 
devices,
80
 10% service taxes on indoor tanning;
81
 $2-per-enrollee fees for 
insurers,
82
 and $60.1 billion over ten years in insurance industry fees.
83
 
Finally, the bill increases the rebates associated with the Medicaid Rebate 
Program,
84
 a program in which pharmaceutical manufacturers must 
“rebate” certain percentages of their sales in exchange for their products 
being eligible for Medicaid coverage.
85
 
Second, the bill directly reduces certain federal government 
expenditures. In particular, it reduces a variety of types of Medicare 
payments to physicians and hospitals. It reduces funding for the 
Disproportionate Share Hospital program,
86
 which compensates any 
 
Costs?, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/11/ AR2010011103585.html. 
74. PPACA § 9001, amended by HCERA § 1401. 
75. HCERA § 1401(a)(2)(C). 
76. PPACA § 9001, amended by HCERA § 1401(a)(2)(E). 
77. PPACA § 9015(a)(1), modified by § 10906, amended by HCERA § 1402(b)(2). 
78. HCERA. § 1402(a). 
79. PPACA § 9008, amended by HCERA § 1404. 
80. HCERA § 1405. The Senate Bill‟s original tax was repealed and replaced 
entirely by HCERA. See PPACA at § 9009, modified by § 10904, repealed by HCERA § 
1405(d). 
81. PPACA § 10907 (nullifying § 9017, a tax on cosmetic medical procedures). 
82. Id. § 6301(e)(2)(A). 
83. PPACA § 9010, modified by § 10905, amended by HCERA at § 1406(a)(4). 
84. See PPACA §§ 2501-2502. 
85. See Congressional Budget Office, How the Medicaid Rebate on Prescription 
Drugs Affects Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Jan. 1996, 
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=4750&type=0.  
86. PPACA § 2551. 
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hospital which has a “disproportionate share” of non-paying patients.87 It 
completely eliminates the “Medicare Improvement Fund,”88 a fund 
through which HHS could have made unspecified improvements to 
Medicare in the years 2014 and 2015.
89
 It reduces payments to Medicare 
Advantage,
90
 a subset of Medicare in which plans can be administered by 
private insurers.
91
 Most dramatically, PPACA implements “market basket 
reductions”—that is, it reduces the scheduled prices for Medicare 




Third and finally, the bill establishes a variety of measures designed to 
reduce federal government medical expenses over the long-term. Chiefly, 
they can be organized into anti-corruption, pay-for-performance and pilot 
programs, and an independent advisory board. 
Its anti-corruption provisions include, among other programs: 
expanding the definition of “federal health care offense” and increasing 
associated sentences;
93
 eliminating new instances of the whole-hospital 
exception in prohibitions on physician hospital ownership;
94
 mandating 
disclosure of physician payments from or ownership in drug and device 
manufacturers;
95
 and increased funding for the Health Care Fraud Abuse 
 
87. See Department of Health and Human Services, Disproportionate Share Hospital, 
http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/cms/dsh.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) (describing the 
impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 on DSH funding). 
88. PPACA § 3112. 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1395iii (2009). 
90. See, e.g., PPACA § 3201(b) (specifying a spending freeze for 2011); § 
3201(d)(2) (codifying a more competitive, actuarially-based bidding process). 
91. Medicare.gov, Medicare Advantage Plans, 
http://www.medicare.gov/choices/advantage.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) (detailing 
various options associated with Medicare Advantage); AARP Health, Medicare 
Advantage Transition, http://www.aarphealthcare.com/products/medicareadvantage/ (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2010) (explaining that Medicare Advantage is privately administered). 
92. See PPACA § 3401. 
93. Id. § 10606. 
94. PPACA § 6001, modified by § 10601, amended by HCERA, Pub. L. 111-152, § 
1106 (2010). The so-called “Stark Law” was designed to prevent the conflict-of-interest 
that could result from physicians owning hospitals to which they could admit patients. 
See MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI, & DAVID ORENTLICHER, THE LAW OF 
HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND REGULATION 592 (2d ed. 2008). 
95. PPACA § 6002. 






The bill includes a loose sort of “pay for performance” scheme for 
hospitals, in which Medicare hospital payments are reduced slightly to 
fund incentive payments for high-performance.
97
 “High-performance” is 
left to HHS‟s discretion, but must include efficiency measures, “including 
measures of „Medicare spending per beneficiary.‟”98 It also reduces 
payments to hospitals which have “excess readmissions”99—that is, 
patients being readmitted to the hospital due to poor care—and to 
hospitals in the risk-adjusted top quartile for health care acquired 
conditions.
100
 Additionally, certain groups of providers, including 
physicians and hospitals, will be permitted to function as “Accountable 
Care Organizations,” which will share some of the savings from cost 
reduction—provided that quality does not fall.101 
PPACA also includes a variety of pilot programs and experiments 
aimed at reducing costs. For example, it authorizes HHS to begin pilot 




 In the case 
of payment bundling, HHS is authorized to expand the pilot so long as 
quality of care does not suffer.
104
 Additionally, HHS is authorized to 
award five-year “demonstration grants” to states to develop “alternatives 
to current tort litigation” relating to health care.105 Presumably, successful 
programs would be presented to Congress for wider consideration. 
Fourth and finally, PPACA authorizes the creation of an Independent 
Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) comprised of fifteen voting members 
appointed by the President to have “a mix of different professionals” 
including health economics experts, physicians, and others.
106
 The IPAB, 
 
96. Id. § 6402(i). 
97. Id. § 3001. 
98. Id. § 3001(a). 
99. Id. § 3025. 
100. Id. § 2702. Hospital acquired conditions are defined by the Social Security Act 
as “conditions that could reasonably have been prevented through the application of 
evidence-based guidelines.” 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)(4)(D)(iv) (2006). 
101. PPACA §§ 2706, 3022, 3129. 
102. Id. § 3023, modified by § 10308. 
103. Id. § 10326. 
104. Id. § 10308(a)(2). 
105. Id. § 10607. 
106. Id. § 3403 (referred to as Independent Medicare Advisory Board), modified by § 
10320 (designating a name change).  
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intended to “reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare spending,”107 
would develop “detailed and specific proposals” and submit those 
proposals to MedPAC, HHS, the President, and Congress.
108
 These 
proposals “shall not include any recommendation to ration health care, 
raise revenues . . . or otherwise restrict benefits of modify eligibility 
criteria.”109 Certain IPAB recommendations—especially those relating to 
Medicare Advantage and Part D plans—would be automatically 




E. Other Provisions 
In addition to the four components mentioned above, PPACA also 
contains several provisions aimed at improving access to health insurance 
and to medical care more generally. 
Most famously, it requires each state to establish an “American Health 
Benefit Exchange,”111 or to participate in a multi-state Exchange.112 
Exchanges would ideally perform a valuable informational function for 
consumers, acting as a database and streamlined resource where 
consumers could research and purchase insurance plans. These exchanges 
will start in 2014 covering individual and small employer markets; in 
2017, states may opt to include large group employers as well. Each plan 
in an Exchange must meet federally-mandated minimum benefit 
standards.
113
 These standards have yet to be determined and remain at the 
discretion of HHS, although several specific components are specified.
114
 
While states are permitted to set higher standards, they must pay the 





108. Id. There would be no proposal requirement in the event of certain findings 
about per capital growth rate by the Chief Actuary. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. § 1311(a). 
112. Id. § 1311(f). Any multi-state exchange is subject to HHS approval; HHS thus 
retains implicit authority to force a state to form its own exchange. Id. 
113. Id. § 1311(d)(2)(B)(i) (“An Exchange may not make available any health plan 
that is not a qualified health plan.”). 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33. PPACA repeats the requirement for 
mental health parity in § 1311(j). 
115. PPACA § 1311(d)(3)(B). 
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Exchange plans are to be sorted according to “actuarial value,” the 
percentage of projected medical expenses which is covered by a given 
plan.
116
 A “Bronze” plan has an actuarial value of 60%, and each 
additional tier increases that percentage: Silver (70%), Gold (80%), and 
Platinum (90%).
117
 HHS would “rate” each plan “on the basis of relative 
quality and price,”118 and would post its rating online, accompanied by 
enrollee satisfaction data.
119
 Exchanges must demand justification for any 
premium increases from insurers who seek Exchange certification,
120
 but 
they are not permitted to exclude a plan from the Exchange by using 
premium price controls
121
 and are expressly prohibited from rationing life-
saving medical treatments.
122
 Exchanges will have a standard format for 
displaying health benefits plan options,
123
 calculators to incorporate any 
federal subsidies,
124
 and other tools.
125
 Exchanges will also serve as the 
reporting medium for indicating, among other things, individuals whose 




In addition to Exchanges, PPACA provides several other provisions 
designed to improve access to care. While it has no government-financed 
insurance plan (a “public option”127), it provides for the government to 
 
116. California HealthCare Foundation, Actuarial Value: A Method for Comparing 
Helth Plan Benefits, 
http://www.chcf.org/topics/healthinsurance/index.cfm?itemID=133789 (last visited Apr. 
17, 2010). 
117. PPACA § 1302(d). 
118. Id. § 1311(c)(3). 
119. Id. §§ 1311(c)(3)-(5). § 1311(c)(3) appears to have a minor error, denoting the 
Internet portal as being established in § 1311(c)(4); it is actually established in § 
1311(c)(5). 
120. Id. § 1311(e)(2). 
121. Id. § 1311(e)(1)(B)(ii). 
122. Id. § 1311(e)(1)(B)(iii). 
123. Id. § 1311(d)(4)(E). 
124. Id. § 1311(d)(4)(G). 
125. For example, the Exchange must have a toll-free hotline, an Internet website, 
rating information, and information about the mandate. Id. § 1311(d)(4). 
126. Id. § 1311(d)(4)(I)(ii). 
127. For use of the term, see Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 'Public Option' in Health Plan 
May Be Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/health/policy/18talkshows.html (last visited Apr. 
17, 2010). 
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oversee and negotiate contracts for at least two multi-state plans through 
the Office of Personnel Management, and at least one of these plans must 
be financed by a non-profit insurer.
128
  
More directly, the law also expands existing programs. First, it 
requires that states extend Medicaid to all non-elderly individuals up to 
133% of FPL—removing all previous non-income qualifications.129 The 
simplicity of this change almost disguises its importance, but it is 
obviously valuable for the applicable population. Second, it provides 23% 
in additional federal funding for the Children‟s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP) from the years 2016-2019.
130
 Third, over the next ten years 
HCERA closes a gap in Medicare prescription drug coverage—the famous 




Finally, the bill attempts to increase access to medical care 
independent of insurance status. It allocates an expansion investment 
fund
133
 and general funding
134
 for Community Health Centers (CHCs),
 
defined previously by the Public Health Service Act
135
 as being designed 
to reach medically underserved populations, with particular emphasis on 
migrant workers, the homeless, and residents of public housing.
136
 CHCs 
are required to adjust discounts “on the basis of the patient‟s ability to 
pay,” making them a valuable resource for the impoverished and 
uninsured.
137
 PPACA also requires tax-exempt hospitals to provide lists of 
standard charges, to adopt and publicize a financial assistance policy, and 
to bill qualifying patients no more than “the amounts generally billed.”138 
Regrettably, this Note can provide only a partial summary of 
PPACA‟s provisions. PPACA also effects changes in the health care 
 
128. PPACA § 10104, adding § 1334. 
129. Id. § 2001 
130. Id. § 2101, amended by § 10203(c)(2)(a)(i). 
131. See Duff Wilson, Filling the Donut Hole, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010 at A10. 
132. HCERA, Pub. L. 111-152, at § 1101(b) (2010) (“Closing the Medicare 
Prescription Drug Donut Hole”). 
133. PPACA at § 10503. 
134. Compare PPACA § 5601(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 254b(r). 
135. 42 U.S.C. § 254b. 
136. Id. § 254b 
137. Id. § 254b(k)(3)(G)(i). 
138. See PPACA § 9007, modified by § 10903. 





 preventive care services,
140
 and other areas. In addition, this 
Note deals with PPACA at its eventual, complete implementation, since 
detailing the bill‟s “transitional” provisions141 would require much more 
space. Nonetheless, the major provisions of the bill are represented here, 
and Part I serves as the crucial underpinning for an examination of the 
design of health reform. 
II. THE ARCHITECTURE OF REFORM 
 “What ends do we expect health insurance to serve in our society?” 
asks Professor Mary Crossley.
142
 That question constitutes “the struggle 
for the soul of health insurance,”143 and I argue that the answer—as given 
by the President and by Congress—necessarily dictates the entire structure 
of health reform. The philosophic core of the bill establishes the standards 
against which empirical effects must be measured. I propose here that the 
bill is designed with one chief objective: ensuring that all citizens, 
regardless of any preexisting conditions, have reliable access to stable 
health insurance. A close examination will demonstrate that each of the 
major provisions of health reform is designed to protect that singular goal. 
A. Solidarity Insurance and Community Rating 
In an unregulated market, insurance is fairly simple: companies permit 
risk-averse individuals to purchase plans that ameliorate that risk. In 
exchange, those individuals pay slightly more than they expect to gain, 
allowing the insurer to pay overhead costs and collect profits. Market 
insurance is not meant to help people buy things they could otherwise not 
afford; it is meant to make their finances predictable. It distributes risk, 
not expense. 
Crucially, that risk must be distributed across a pool of policyholders 
which, ex ante,
144
 appears identical. If some are predictably higher-risks, 
 
139. Id. §§ 5001-5701. 
140. Id. §§4001-4402. 
141. For example, PPACA dictates that HHS will establish a temporary high-risk 
pool which would continue through 2013 and end promptly thereafter. Id. § 1101. 
142. See Crossley, supra note 10, at 1. 
143. Id. 
144. For a discussion of ex ante versus ex post distrinctions, see Uwe E. Reinhardt, Is 
„Community Rating‟ in Health Insurance Fair?, N.Y. TIMES, Economix Blog, Jan. 1, 
2010 (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). 
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then the low-risk population would break off to form a new pool in which 
they would pay lower premiums. Insurance pools thus tend to segregate, 
with high-risk patients consistently excluded from low-risk, lower-
premium pools. 
This is precisely how the insurance industry has historically operated. 
As Crossley explains, “[d]iscrimination against unhealthy persons is 
deeply ingrained” in health insurance, and is “generally accepted as a 
legitimate application of . . . risk-classification.”145 When less-healthy 
patients find a good insurance deal en masse, the plan becomes 
unsustainable. Any single insurer which finds itself “stuck” with a high-
risk pool will bleed money to pay the health care costs of the less-healthy 
patients. If it increases rates to cover costs, it will bleed even more money 
as healthy policyholders flee to other, lower-premium insurers, and the 
original insurer will promptly go bankrupt. 
The President highlighted rescission as being a particularly horrifying 
practice,
146
 but it is actually a fairly predictable economic result of market 
insurance: it is, simply put, low-risk people kicking high-risk people out of 
their pool to keep premiums low. Indeed, these stories are far from rare.
147
 
To President Obama and Democratic leaders in Congress, this segregation 
contradicts the very purpose of health insurance, which ought to follow 
what Professor Crossley describes as a “social solidarity” model, in which 
“healthy persons subsidize the care received by unhealthy persons,”148 
rather than a model which would be “actuarially fair.”149  
It is easy to sympathize, even without fully subscribing to Crossley‟s 
solidarity model. Stories of people denied life-saving medical care 
precisely when they need it the most represent a horrifying prospect. It is 
similarly troubling to contemplate, as the President does,
150
 people who 
can never purchase insurance in the first place, or who are denied renewal. 
Accordingly, PPACA illegalizes denials, rescissions, and discriminatory 
pricing. A normal market pushes insurers to charge an experience rate 
based on that individual‟s past experience. PPACA forces insurers to 
 
145. See Crossley, supra note 10 (emphasis added). 
146. Obama, supra note 6. The original testimony was reported by NPR. See 
Silberner, supra note 15. 
147. See Silberner, supra note 15. 
148. See Crossley, supra note 10, at 1. 
149. Id. at 78 (describing actuarial fairness: “each individual should bear financial 
responsibility for his own risk of incurring medical expenses”). 
150. See Obama, supra note 6. 
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charge a community rate—a consistent premium which ignores health 
status. The bill hopes that this will provide health insurance access for 
even the sick and the disabled. Community rating is an economic term, but 
it also represents aptly the chief goal of PPACA. 
More than anything else, health reform institutes the solidarity model 
of health insurance, effectively desegregating basic access to health care. 
In so doing, however, it exacerbates another problem: adverse selection. 
That dilemma has always threatened health insurance, but it becomes 
particularly poignant in the face of community rating. Necessarily, 
therefore, PPACA institutes an attempted solution: the mandate. 
B. Adverse Selection and the Mandate 
The constant threat to insurance, as outlined by 2001 Nobel Prize 
winner Joseph Stiglitz and co-author Bruce Greenwald in a landmark 1986 
article,
151
 stems from the problem of asymmetric information. Any party 
which has more information than its economic partners can exploit that 
difference to gain an advantage—often destabilizing economic systems 
wholesale.  
While health insurance was not the subject of Stiglitz‟s work, adverse 
selection is a particularly severe problem in medical economics, and is one 
of the dominant justifications for government intervention.
152
 As framed 
by Professor Charles Phelps: 
[A] lingering question persists, at least in theory, about the intrinsic 
stability of the health insurance market. The problem hinges on the 
difference in information held by buyers of insurance (consumers) and 
sellers of insurance (insurance companies). The buyers know more 
about their own health than the sellers. Thus, the risk exists that 
insurance companies will put an insurance plan into the market that uses 
one set of actuarial projections about the costs of insured people but 
ends up attracting a special subset of the population with unusually high 
health care costs. Obviously, the insurance company would go broke if 
this happened repeatedly. This is called the problem of . . . “adverse 
 
151. Bruce C. Greenwald and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with 
Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 90 Q.J. ECON. 229 (1986). 
152. Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance 
Markets, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 89 (2001). 




Private market health insurance, at least until PPACA was passed, 
depended on combating adverse selection. Insurers worked studiously to 
avoid bad health risks because healthy customers “obviously do not want 
[sicker] people in their insurance pool, because the average costs and 
hence the premiums will be driven up.”154 The entire health insurance 
market, therefore, becomes vulnerable to “„bad risks chasing good risks.‟ . 
. . people racing from group to group in a frenzy of sickly people seeking 
coverage and healthy people trying to evade sickly people.”155 Sustainably 
profitable plans, therefore, were those which excelled at evading that pool 
of less-healthy patients. Any plan that failed to do this would fall prey to 
the famous “death spiral” of adverse selection.156 
This was seen most dramatically in an accidental 1995 experiment.
157
 
Harvard University shifted from a conventional, employer-subsidized 
system to a voucher system. It paid employees a certain amount and they 
selected an insurance plan and paid for the difference themselves.
158
 
Employees suddenly bore the costs of selecting a higher-cost plan, and 
economists correctly suspected that healthy employees would gravitate 
towards the lowest-coverage plan. “Consistent with the theory,” reported 
Professor David M. Cutler, “the policy change induced substantial adverse 
selection. Within three years of the pricing reform, adverse selection 
eliminated the market for more generous insurance entirely.”159  
Classically, insurance plans cohere largely because the transactions 
costs associated with employer-based insurance prevent too much 
movement in insurance markets.
160
 But adverse selection nonetheless lurks 
 
153. CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS 334 (3d ed. 2003). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. See Anemona Hartocollis, New York Offers Costly Lessons on Insurance, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/nyregion/18insure.html (utilizing the term “death 
spiral”). 
157. David M. Cutler and Sarah J. Reber, Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-
Off Between Competition and Adverse Selection, 113 Q.J. ECON. 433 (1998). 
158. Id. at 434. 
159. Id. at 434-435. Cutler and Reber do, however, report net benefits associated 
with the move. 
160. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health 
Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL‟Y L. & ETHICS 23 (2001). 
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in the system, and PPACA‟s imposition of community rating will 
exacerbate it dramatically. Accordingly, when the President and Congress 
wanted to provide coverage to bad-risk candidates, they had to address the 
problem of adverse selection. 
The most obvious way to do so is, of course, to impose a law that 
prevents good risks from fleeing. Classically, this is done via mandated 
benefits. As elaborated by Larry Summers in 1989,
161
 mandated benefits 
prohibit the offering of any package—in this case, any health insurance 
plan—which omits certain benefits. These sorts of mandates do not 
require individuals to purchase insurance, but those who choose to do so 
must buy a certain amount of coverage. 
The benefit is obvious: mandates dramatically alleviate the problem of 
adverse selection, since good risks cannot flee to a low-coverage plan. For 
example, women usually have better knowledge than insurers regarding 
their own childbearing plans. Women who do not plan on having children 
thus tend to exit any plan that offers maternity coverage—and such plans 
fall into the death spiral. By forcing all insurers to cover maternity care, 
women who do plan on having children can find coverage because all 
plans face an even playing field. 
The problem here is also obvious: with too high a floor, good risks 
will exit the health insurance market entirely. Indeed, PPACA specifies 
that all plans must include obstetrics coverage even for men—obviously a 
useless feature. Many “good risks” will similarly feel that coverage for 
substance abuse rehabilitation and other such services is not worth the 
additional premiums. If enough of a plan is comprised of such services, 
those individuals might exit the insurance market entirely—either self-
insuring or, as Summers
162
 and the President
163
 describe, forcing others to 
bear the costs of their care. 
 
161. Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, AEA 
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, May 1989, at 179. Summers‟ examples of adverse selection 
involve healthy employees fleeing employers who offer too-expensive insurance, but the 
same idea applies to insurance plans more broadly. He does give the specific example of 
a health plan that includes AIDS benefits. See id. at 179, n.1. 
162. Id. at 178 (referring to “the externality that arises from society‟s unwillingness 
or inability to deny care completely to those in desperate need, even if they cannot pay”). 
163. See Obama, supra note 6 (“If there are affordable options and people still don't 
sign up for health insurance, it means we pay for these people's expensive emergency 
room visits.”); but see infra notes 235-236 and text accompanying (arguing that the 
President‟s point is not persuasive). 
 ADVERSE REACTIONS 
25 
 
And so PPACA takes the direct solution and imposes a complete 
mandate. Classic mandates regulate underinsurance, but PPACA 
progresses to regulating uninsurance. Its fine on uninsurance decreases the 
opportunity cost of coverage and thus functions like a subsidy. If 
successful, the mandate will prevent adverse selection and death spirals. 
The mandate was designed to solve adverse selection, but it raises a 
problem of its own: it would be absurd to impose a mandate on people 
who could not afford insurance. One could, of course, simply build in a 
hardship exemption, and PPACA does so. But that hardship exemption 
alone would be self-defeating: medical costs have been rising steadily over 
time, and eventually the exemption could conceivably cover a large 
proportion of the American population. Here, too, PPACA attempts to 
provide a solution. 
C. Expenses and Subsidies 
The cost of medical insurance is rising quickly. Between 1999 and 
2008, cumulative increase in health insurance premiums was 119%, 
compared with cumulative inflation of just 29%.
164
 In New York, the 
highest-cost state, a family plan now costs an average of $13,296.
165
 When 
viewed in the context of costs like these, a mandate compelling a family to 
buy insurance can appear positively cruel. PPACA thus imposes the most 
direct solution: a subsidy. 
As described above,
166
 PPACA‟s subsidies are, from a consumer‟s 
perspective, designed as price caps. A family making 400% of the poverty 
level, for example, pays a maximum of 9.5% of its income in premiums, 
indexed to medical inflation. 
Additionally, PPACA addresses a related concern: underinsurance. 
Professor Elizabeth Warren—now in the Obama Administration—and 
others have published statistics arguing that more than half of bankruptcies 
are caused by medical-related phenomena.
167
 Most recently, Professor 
 
164. See Kaiser Family Found., Trends in Health Care Costs and Spending 2 (2009), 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7692_02.pdf. 
165. America‟s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 26. 
166. See generally supra Part I.C. 
167. See, e.g., David Himmelstein, Elizabeth Warren, Deborah Thorne, and Steffie 
Woolhandler, Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF. W5-67 
(Web Exclusive Feb. 2, 2005) (“Slightly more than half (54.5 percent) . . . met criteria for 
„any medical bankruptcy.‟”). 
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David Himmelstein and others have argued that 62% of bankruptcies can 
be traced to a medical problem.
168
 These sorts of statistics have been hotly 
disputed,
169
 but the President appears to have internalized their underlying 
claims.
170
 Most frighteningly, many of these experts argue forcefully that 
health insurance was often not enough to stem these financial disasters.
171
 
Between deductibles, co-pays, and coinsurance, many of these families 
fell into financial hardship despite the presence of insurance. Even routine 




These cost-sharing provisions may cause even insured families to 
ration needed medical care,
173
 exacerbating underlying problems and 
increasing overall medical expenses. This seems to defeat the solidarity 
purpose of health insurance: to help provide medical care for those who 
most need it. 
Whatever the merits of the underlying methodological dispute, 
Professor Warren‟s work is compelling at least as a narrative, and the 
 
168. David U. Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Steffie 
Woolhandler, Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National 
Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 742 (2009). 
169. See, e.g., David Dranove & Michael Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth 
Versus Fact, 25 HEALTH AFF. w78 (2006) 
170. See Obama, supra note 6 (“Everyone in this room knows what will happen if 
we do nothing. . . . More families will go bankrupt.”). 
171. See Himmelstein et al., supra note 167 (claiming that among “medical debtors . 
. . three-fourths (75.7 precent) of these debtors were insured at the onset of the 
bankrupting illness.”). 
172. Melissa B. Jacoby and Mirya R. Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink 
of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL‟Y L. & ETHICS 239, 246 (forthcoming 2010) 
(“Contemporary studies continue to report that cost-sharing results in delinquent medical 
debt with some prevalence, even for routine care.” (internal citations omitted)). 
173. See, e.g., id. at 247 n.30 (“This point is frequently made.” (citing PETER J. 
CUNNINGHAM & LAURIE E. FELLAND, FALLING BEHIND: AMERICANS„ 
ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE DETERIORATES, 2003-2007, 2 (Center for Studying 
Health Sys. Change, Tracking Rep. No. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/993/993.pdf (noting cost was ―most frequently 
cited—and growing—obstacle to care‖); Cathy Schoen et al., In Chronic Condition: 
Experiences of Patients with Complex Health Care Needs, in Eight Countries, 2008, 28 
HEALTH AFF. w1, w5 (2008) (discussing cost-related deterrence of treatment, 
particularly among U.S. patients); Robert W. Seifert & Mark Rukavina, Bankruptcy Is the 
Tip of a Medical-Debt Iceberg, 25 HEALTH AFF. w89, w90 (2006))). 
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President‟s comments seem to indicate that he shares her concerns.174 
Indeed, the bill itself recites her findings.
175
 Accordingly, PPACA imposes 
a cost-sharing cap on insurance plans: after a policyholder has spent 
$2,250 in out-of-pocket expenses ($4,500 for a family), the insurance plan 
is not permitted to impose any further cost-sharing.
176
 
Still, for many families, $4,500 would be a significant burden. The bill 
therefore also provides government subsidies for cost-sharing—preventing 
the “underinsurance” problem that so many bankruptcy articles raise. For 
families between 100% and 400% of the FPL, the government pays for 
70-94% of their out-of-pocket expenses,
177
 dramatically reducing the 
burden of premiums and the incentive to self-ration. 
By making health insurance and cost-sharing affordable, subsidies 
thus solve the problems caused by mandates. And yet they create their 
own problem: the government must find the money to pay for them. 
D. Deficits, Taxes, and Spending Cuts 
In February 2010, President Obama signed into law the PAYGO Rule, 
establishing that no new tax cuts or government spending provisions could 
be enacted without a corresponding tax increase or spending reduction.
178
 
In other words, the “pay-as-you-go” rule prohibits any legislative package 
that would, on balance, worsen the deficit.
179
 PPACA imposes a variety of 
new spending measures, including subsidies and Medicaid expansions. To 
comply with PAYGO Rules—and, probably, for political reasons—
Congress included several revenue-raising provisions to ensure that CBO 
could project a deficit reduction. 
 
174. See Obama, supra note 6. 
175. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1502(a)(2)(E) (2010) (“Half of all personal 
bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses.”). 
176. See PPACA § 1302(c)(1), I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii), I.R.C. §§ 223(c)(2)(B)(ii). 
177. See supra p. 10, tbl.2. 
178. Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, 2 U.S.C. § 931. 
179. CBO specifically points out that “pay-as-you-go procedures would apply” to 
PPACA and HCERA. See Letter from CBO, supra note 13. 
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Table 3: CBO Estimated 2010-2019 Deficit Effects (in billions of 
dollars, with negative numbers denoting deficit reductions)
180
 
Spending Increases  
Subsidies via Premium Tax Credits 350 
Medicaid Expansions 434 
Exchange-Related Spending 7 
Other Changes in Direct Spending 30 
  
Spending Decreases  
Reduction in Physician Fee For Service Schedule -332 
Medicare and Medicaid DSH Payment Reductions -36 
Other Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP Provisions -87 
Decreased Reimbursement for Community Living Assiatance 
Services -70 
  
Increases in Tax Revenue  
Mandate Fine -65 
"Cadillac Tax" -32 
Associated Effects of Coverage Provisions -46 
Industry Fees -107 
Hospital Insurance Tax -210 
Other Revenue Provisions -103 
  
Decreases in Tax Revenue  
Subsidies via Premium Tax Credits 144 
  
Total Change in Deficit -123 
 
CBO‟s estimates indicate that the bill‟s tax increases and spending 
decreases sufficiently cover the increased expenditures of health reform, 
and even reduce the deficit. It is important to note that CBO‟s estimates do 
not appear to project any overall reductions in medical spending from 
preventive care measures. 
Finally, of course, Congress wanted to ensure that the expansions in 
 
180. See CBO, supra note 13, tbl.2. 
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insurance would, indeed, increase access to health insurance. CBO 
estimated that they would: 
 
  Table 4: CBO Estimates on Changes in Insurance Coverage 




Medicaid and CHIP +16 
Employer -3 
Nongroup and Medicare -5 
Exchanges +24 
  
Total Uninsured -32 
 
CBO‟s estimates, then, accord very clearly with the President‟s stated 
desires: PPACA prevents certain insurance behaviors like rescission; it 
helps reduce the ranks of the uninsured through Medicaid expansions and 
subsidies; and, according to CBO, it will reduce federal deficits. 
The so-called “Cadillac tax,” of course, is designed to generate 
revenue—about $32 billion, according to CBO‟s estimates.182 It also, 
however, serves a second purpose: to slow the rising costs of medical care. 
The excise tax is intentionally indexed not to medical inflation, but to 
general consumer inflation. If health premium growth continues to outpace 
general inflation, then over time a greater and greater proportion of plans 
will fall into “Cadillac” territory.  
Part of the explanation for perpetually rising costs is that they are 
subsidized by the income tax system—employer-provided health 
insurance provides value for the employee but is not taxed the way other 
income would be. Health insurance becomes “cheaper than any other good 
or service the employee might buy, because the health insurance is 
purchased with before-tax dollars.”183 The amount of this subsidy, as of 
1994, was estimated to be as much as $90 billion.
184
 The Cadillac tax 
begins to remedy this in the most obvious way: by closing the loophole, 
starting with the most expensive plans and gradually expanding to 
 
181. Id. at tbl.4. 
182. See supra tbl.3.  
183. PHELPS, supra note 153, at 345. 
184. Id. at 350. 
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encompass more and more of them, thus pressuring insurance plans to 
become less generous. As David Leonhardt of the New York Times 
explains: “The cost of insurance could rise. Or perhaps more likely, 
companies would stop offering such generous plans. . . . Would that be so 
bad?”185 If this tax functions as designed, employees would shy away from 
high-cost plans;
186
 the most expensive benefits would probably be dropped 
from most plans without harming actual health;
187
 and, hopefully, the 
money saved can take the form of higher wages.
188
 
Most importantly, as Leonhardt argues:  
This tax break causes us to buy more health insurance than we would if 
the playing field for taxes were level, much as the tax breaks for 
housing helped inflate the real estate bubble. In effect, the tax-free 
treatment is a subsidy for health insurers, doctors and hospitals. It 
encourages wasteful spending — the extra M.R.I., the brand-name drug 
that‟s no better than a generic, the cardiac-stent procedure that has no 
evidence of extending life.
189
 
If Leonhardt‟s predictions prove true, then these inflated insurance 
plans, which lead to excess demand for medical services, would be 
dramatically reduced. Accordingly, the Cadillac tax would accomplish 
much more than deficit reduction—it would slow medical spending as a 




While most of the tax increases are designed to directly reduce the 
 
185. David Leonhardt, Economic Scene: How a Tax Can Cut Health Care Costs, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/business/economy/30leonhardt.html. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. (“people with Cadillac plans aren‟t healthier than people with merely good 
insurance”). 
188. Id. (“wage increases are often meager when insurance premiums are growing 
quickly”). 
189. Id.  
190. Professor Greg Mankiw, formerly a key member of President George W. 
Bush‟s Council of Economic Advisors, agrees, calling the Cadillac tax “a reasonable 
policy from the standpoint of economic efficiency.” Greg Mankiw, The Incidence of the 
Cadillac Tax, GREG MANKIW‟S BLOG, Oct. 13, 2009, 
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2009/10/incidence-of-cadillac-tax.html. Mankiw also 
points out, however, that it very clearly breaks President Obama's “„read my lips, no new 
taxes unless you're rich‟ campaign pledge.” Id. 
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deficit, we thus see that some of them were also designed to slow the 
growth of overall medical spending. If they succeed, they will help make 
insurance more affordable not just for individuals, but for the nation as a 
whole. These taxes are designed to help pay for the subsidies that enable 
the rest of the bill—and, in so doing, they make the entire reform package 
possible. 
E. The Philosophical Core and Political Robustness 
The core of the bill, we now see, is in fact a single coherent plan, not 
an assortment of ideas. It also addresses related concerns—the burden of 
cost-sharing, rising premiums, and others—but it has four essential 
components. First, its central provision is enforced community rating. 
Community rating exacerbates adverse selection, and so PPACA imposes 
an insurance mandate. The mandate would be self-defeating and cruel 
without subsidies, and so PPACA provides them. Subsidies are expensive, 
and deficit spending would be politically unpopular and would violate 
PAYGO, and thus the reform package includes a variety of spending 
offsets and tax increases. 
Whether by accident or design, community rating strengthened the 
political prospects of the bill. Even at times when the bill as a whole was 
very controversial, the bill‟s central provision has always been popular. As 
explained in October by Gallup: 
President Obama has remarked that there is widespread agreement in 
Washington on certain aspects of reform, such as requiring insurance 
companies to cover those with pre-existing medical conditions, 
prohibiting insurance companies from dropping those who get sick, and 
providing assistance to lower-income Americans to help them obtain 
insurance. Despite lukewarm support for a new healthcare bill in 
general, existing polling from Gallup and other firms finds Americans 
expressing strong support for provisions such as these, or saying these 
are highly important to include in healthcare legislation.
 191
 
David Frum, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a 
former senior advisor to President Bush, agrees: 
 
191. Frank Newport, Jeffrey M. Jones, and Lydia Saad, Americans on Healthcare 
Reform: Five Key Realities, GALLUP, Oct. 30, 2009, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/123989/americans-healthcare-reform-five-key-realities.aspx 
(emphasis added). 
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Some Republicans talk of repealing the whole bill. That's not very 
realistic. . . . Do Republicans write a one-sentence bill declaring that the 
whole thing is repealed? Will they vote to reopen the "doughnut" hole 
for prescription drugs for seniors? To allow health insurers to deny 
coverage to people with pre-existing conditions? To kick millions of 




The bill‟s central provision is politically popular, and that renders the 
entire bill politically robust.
193
 If Frum and Gallup are right that the central 
provision is too popular to repeal, then the other three pieces must follow 
in sequence. Community rating must be accompanied by a mandate, 
subsidies, and revenue provisions. Opponents may tinker around the 
edges—for example, Frum suggests repeals of certain particular taxes194—
but, fundamentally, the bill originates from a place of political strength. 
That strength served as the President‟s rhetorical base during advocacy, 
helped the bill‟s passage, and now renders the bill effectively 
unrepealable. 
It is easy to see PPACA as mishmash of unrelated ideas, but this Note 
demonstrates the incorrectness of that notion. This legislation was 
specifically designed around one simple idea: that insurers should treat the 
healthy and the sick alike. It is a bill built around Crossley‟s model of 
solidarity, and each of its core provisions is meant to defend that idea. 
III. PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS 
We thus see the bill‟s intended effects—but its actual effects are 
another thing entirely. Will reform really lower costs, expand access, and 
provide security? Part III of this Note provides the comprehensive picture 
necessary to examine that, and concludes that the bill is likely to result in 
dramatic failure. Fundamentally, the math does not work. Health insurance 
 




193. See Ady Barkan, J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, Address to Yale Law 
School American Constitution Society: What‟s Next? Implementing and Expanding the 
Health Care Law (Apr. 8, 2010). 
194. See Frum, supra note 192. 
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will become too expensive, the mandate will be inadequate, insurers will 
find new ways to discriminate, and medical expenses will continue to rise 
along with the federal deficit. PPACA attempts to force too many people 
to behave too contrary to their interests, and this will leave our national 
health system in—to borrow the term—a death spiral.  
None of this is certain or inevitable. Health care delivery depends on a 
series of stakeholders, each necessary to providing access to medical care. 
Accordingly, a great deal of the bill‟s ultimate shape has not yet been 
decided. Congress, HHS, the states, the insurance industry, physicians, 
and the American people as a whole each have a part to play in 
determining the ultimate success or failure of the PPACA.  
A. Solidarity and Insurance Gamesmanship 
The central provision of the PPACA appears, at first glance, to be its 
most robust. Insurers are no longer allowed to reject or charge higher 
premiums to those with preexisting conditions. However, several more 
subtle forms of discrimination remain on the table—and the incentive to 
engage in them is heightened. According to health economist Mark V. 
Pauly, PPACA probably “increase[s] the incentive for cherry-picking,” 
since “I‟m strongly motivated to try to avoid you if I‟m not allowed to 
charge you extra.”195 
In fact, immediately in the wake of the bill, one insurance industry 
lawyer pointed out that insurance companies had limited obligations with 
respect to children. They did “not have to sell to somebody with a pre-
existing condition” until 2014, and “the insurer could increase premiums 
to cover the additional cost.”196 Congressional Democrats were furious, 
with Senator John D. Rockefeller IV saying, “The ink has not yet dried on 
the health reform bill, and already some deplorable health insurance 
companies are trying to duck away from covering children with 
preexisting conditions. This is outrageous.”197 Under White House 
pressure, America‟s Health Insurance Plans, a trade group, quickly agreed 
 
195. David S. Hilzenrath, Economic Agenda: Discrimination by Insurers Likely Even 
with Reform, Experts Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/10/03/AR2009100302483.html. 
196. Robert Pear, Coverage Now for Sick Children? Check Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 28 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/health/policy/29health.html.  
197. Id. 
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to comply with impending Obama administration rules.
198
 Press Secretary 
Robert Gibbs scored the encounter as “Kids 1, insurance 0.”199 Gibbs‟s 
comment was entertaining, but it was also revealing: this provision runs 
directly contrary to insurers‟ interests, and the White House knows it. The 
years to come will likely see an ongoing confrontation between private 
insurers and government attempts to force it to comply with PPACA‟s 
intentions. 
And, indeed, several tools remain on the table for the insurance 
industry. While a great deal will depend on HHS‟s decisions regarding 
essential health benefits, insurers are very experienced in subtle forms of 
“cherry-picking.” To give the classic example: insurance companies often 
offer gym memberships, a bonus which only provides value to those 
healthy enough to use such equipment.
200
 Health insurers can also be 
uncooperative on insurance claims, which would disproportionately affect 
the chronically ill.
201
 Even insurance plans marketed to the elderly tend to 
offer benefits that attract low-risk patients: health club membership, 
eyeglasses, and preventive dental care.
202
 And while insurance plans 
would have to pay for certain expensive treatments such as dialysis, 
nothing in the statute as written forces them to employ a reasonable 
number of physicians who can provide that treatment.
203
 
A great deal also depends on what HHS defines as an “essential 
benefits package.” While much is prescribed by the bill, HHS also retains 
significant authority.
204
 HHS Attorney Jessica Mantel has argued that 
adverse selection will force most plans down to the minimum essential 
benefits package.
205
 To compensate, she believes that the political process 
 
198. Robert Pear, Insurers To Comply with Rules on Children, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/health/policy/31health.html (“„Health plans 
recognize the significant hardship that a family faces when they are unable to obtain 
coverage for a child with a pre-existing condition,‟ said Karen M. Ignagni, president 
America‟s Health Insurance Plans. . .”). 
199. Id.  
200. See Hilzenrath, supra note 195. 
201. Id.  
202. Id.  
203. Id. 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45. 
205. See Jessica Mantel, Health Care Reform: Setting National Coverage Standards 
for Health Plans, 57 UCLA L. REV (forthcoming 2010) (“only individuals who anticipate 
needing treatment for these conditions would purchase the supplemental coverage, 
leaving insurers unable to balance the costs of covering the conditions across a large risk 
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will lead to a high floor.
206
 Patient lobbying groups will demand coverage 
for their conditions; more troublingly, provider lobbying groups (such as 
chiropractors or fertility specialists) might demand coverage to ensure 
demand for their services. This would drive up costs,
207
 but with one 
benefit: some of the cherry-picking techniques described above would be 
off the table. HHS could, for example, require that plans have a reasonable 
number of nephrologists staffing dialysis centers; or it could require all 
plans to include gym membership, preventing plans from using that as a 
screening device. 
Even beyond the benefits offered, however, insurance plans could still 
engage in “cherry-picking.” The names of the plans themselves can 
become slogans targeted at particular audiences. Anthem Blue Cross 
offers a line of policies known as “Part-Time Daredevil” and “Thrill-
Seeker,” with an advertising campaign built around the idea that “You‟re 
young. You‟re healthy. You‟re in shape.”208 Insurance companies could 
market themselves among younger demographics, such as college students 
or Starbuck‟s customers. Small fonts, offices without elevators, and agents 
who operate exclusively out of suburbs could also become standard 
practices. 
Technology, too, offers insurers ways to game the system. Companies 
could market themselves exclusively via emerging social networks such as 
Facebook or Twitter, or via an application exclusive to Apple‟s iPhone. 
Applications that require bandwidth-heavy technologies such as Flash 
could deter those without reliable Internet access, and “captcha” 
technology—a security device designed to screen out automated 
software
209—could just as easily be used to screen out those who type 
slowly, have trouble reading, have weak English skills, or are simply 
unused to computers. Each of these screening techniques becomes more 
important in light of PPACA‟s anti-discrmination provisions. 
Fully aware of this threat, Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.) originally 
proposed a plan that called for the creation of a kind of baseline risk-
 
pool that includes healthy individuals”). 
206. Id. (“political considerations would lead politicians to push for an essential 
health benefits package that includes those conditions and treatments demanded by the 
public or influential special interest groups, regardless of the merits”). 
207. Id.  
208. See Hilzenrath, supra note 195.  
209. See Lev Grossman, Computer Literacy Tests: Are You Human?, TIME, June 5, 
2008, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1812084,00.html. 
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adjustment: insurers that ultimately covered disproportionately sick 
populations would receive higher compensation.
210
 This provision would 
have been highly complicated
211
 and was ultimately dropped. Still, 
Senator Baucus‟s plan could be reinstated if Washington saw it as 
necessary. 
Whether PPACA actually succeeds in implementing meaningful 
community rating and Crossley‟s solidarity model depends on a number of 
factors. In particular, it depends on ultimate outcome of this three-way 
melee between Congress, HHS, and the insurance industry. Again, 
however, a too-successful implementation of community rating risks 
pushing healthy populations to opt out of insurance altogether. 
B. The Mandate: Fines, Premiums, and Civic Duty 
If, as Mantel fears, HHS faces pressure to establish a high-benefit 
insurance package, then more and more healthy Americans will face 
pressure to drop insurance entirely. The prices of the premiums will 
continue to rise for diminishing marginal gains—giving Americans an 
incentive to drop coverage. The mandate is designed precisely to prevent 
this—but, if premiums rise too high, the fine may not be enough to deter 
unraveling. 
At least one Wall Street blog analyzed the changes and came up with 
the following conclusion: “This one's easy. . . drop all coverage. . . . this is 
the only logical action to take.”212 While on the subject, the author 
strongly urged readers to short sell every major health insurance company 
on the theory that they would be pushed into bankruptcy.
213
 The blog was 
incorrect as to the magnitude of the fine
214—a potentially serious error—
but the underlying premise remained: based on a prediction of very large 
premium increases
215
 on par with those seen prior to credit card rate 
 
210. See Hilzenrath, supra note 195. 
211. Among other things, it is not clear why insurers would be receiving 
compensation from the federal government in the first place. 
212. Posting of Karl Denninger to Market Ticker, Health Care: Arbitrage Obama 
and the Dems, http://market-ticker.denninger.net/archives/2109-Health-Care-Arbitrage-
Obama-And-The-Dems.html (Mar. 22, 2010, 1:23PM EST). 
213. Id. (“[T]his is the end of the health industry in America . . . I cannot stop this 
idiocy but I can sure attempt to profit from it.”). 
214. Id. (“a sliding scale that amounts to 2% of your AGI”). 
215. Id. (“The "cheapest" acceptable policy will cost somewhere around $15,000 for 





 it accordingly urged readers to drop health care coverage 
until such time as they become ill.
217
 
If those assumptions prove correct, then the dire predictions foretold 
by the author make a great deal of sense. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear 
what the eventual cost of health insurance will be—partly because HHS 
has not yet established the package of minimum essential benefits. In a 
tentative January estimate, CBO estimated that a bronze family plan, 
already a low-benefits package, would probably average more than 
$12,000
218—approximately double the current national average.219 Plans 
could rise by $6,000 a year or more. 
This projection, roughly speaking, is not ridiculous. As families face 
more and more of an incentive to buy insurance—both because of the 
subsidy and the fine—simple supply and demand economics will drive up 
the price. More importantly, if insurers are not allowed to discriminate 
against the unhealthy, their own costs are likely to spike—and premiums 
will have to rise accordingly. When the state of New York imposed a 
similar non-discrimination requirement,
220
 its premiums spiked to the 
highest in the nation: currently $13,296 for an individual market family 
plan.
221
 New York does not have a mandate—but Massachusetts, which 
does, is the second most expensive: the average family plan costs 
$13,288.
222
 The dropoff is steep: the fourth-most expensive state, Maine, 
has an average family plan of just $7,260.
223
 For CBO to project insurance 
 
a single person, and over $20,000 for a family. This is, for most people, more than five 
times the maximum possible fine”). 
216. Id. (“This is precisely what the banks did in front of the CARD act becoming 
effective, and it will happen here as well.”). 
217. Id. (“If you have a catastrophe of any form, buy the insurance at that point in 
time. You cannot be turned down or charged more.”) (emphasis in original). Denninger 
notes the risk of a “zero-notice catastrophe,” but urges readers to self-insure. Id.  
218. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office, to Olympia Snowe, U.S. Sen. (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10884/01-11-Premiums_for_Bronze_Plan.pdf.  
219. America‟s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 26, at 4. 
220. See Hartocollis, supra note 156 (“Healthy people, in effect, began to subsidize 
people who needed more health care. The healthier customers soon discovered that the 
high premiums were not worth it and dropped out of the plans. The pool of insured 
people shrank to the point where many of them had high health care needs.”). 
221. America‟s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 26, at 6 tbl.3. 
222. Id.  
223. Id. Maine is the fourth-most expensive state according to Table 3, which ranks 
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costs into the $12,000 range once federal regulation resembles that in 
Massachusetts and New York, then, is not ridiculous. 
Will families simply pay the mandate fine? It is difficult to say, 
because extrapolation is nearly impossible in this scenario. Still, a rough 
estimate makes clear that the bill‟s attempt at reform is in very dire straits. 
Assuming that health insurance is currently priced according to demand, 
families are generally gaining about as much benefit from their insurance 
plans as they pay in premiums. Increasing their premiums gives them an 
incentive to drop coverage; imposing a fine gives them incentive to keep 
it. But the incentive to drop, in this analysis, is stronger than the incentive 
to keep unless a family is making more than $244,000 a year.
224
 
Moreover, PPACA explicitly states that failure to pay the fine cannot 
result in criminal prosecution, liens, or levies.
225
 Finally, if CBO‟s 
estimates are correct, many families will fall into the hardship 
exemption—an insurance plan that costs $12,000 a year would not require 




Put another way: families below $88,200 will usually have some 




by the price for a single person. The fourth-most expensive family plan is Connecticut‟s, 
at $8,477—still a dramatic fall from Massachusetts and New York. Id.  
224. The calculation is highly dependent on other estimates, but is conceptually 
simple enough. If healthy families are gaining about $6,000 worth of benefit from their 
$6,000 plan, and if they gain no more from a $12,000 plan, then they will be paying an 
excess of about $6,000—meaning they would be better off dropping insurance until their 
fine reaches about $6,000. Most families probably have some current economic rent—
that is, excess gains—from their current insurance plans, but the $12,000 estimate will be 
for a Bronze plan that is likely to drop some elements that families currently find 
valuable. (It is important to remember that the original $6,000 would not disappear for 
newly-uninsured families; they would be able to use it to self-insure.) It is difficult to 
guess which of these two effects will dominate, especially considering that some families 
are probably overpaying now thanks to the illusion that their employer is actually paying. 
See Hyman & Hall, supra note 160 (“most employees (and some employers) believe that 
employers are footing the bill for the coverage that employees receive. The result is that 
employees are relatively indifferent to the cost of their health care coverage”). In any 
case, families may well begin to self-insure when hit with a higher premium bill—again 
helping to make this estimate conservative in this respect. 
225. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b) (2010). 
226. See supra note 48 and text accompanying. 
227. The government subsidy would cap premiums at 9.5% of income. See supra 
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family above $244,000 has an incentive to keep insurance, because the 
fine is much higher than the money they would. Any family in-between 
would be economically better off by going uninsured—not least because 
many of them are likely to fall into the hardship exemption! While 
families usually do not have precise estimates of the value of their 
insurance plan in mind, the projected changes would be very large in 
magnitude and would certainly catch many families‟ attentions, if only in 
a rough sense. 
This analysis is, by necessity, approximate. It depends on a great deal 
of assumptions that will almost certainly have to be somewhat revisited—
but the qualitative ramifications are nonetheless staggering. They are even 
more frightening for employer-sponsored insurance, where CBO estimates 
that an average family plan would cost $19,200.
228
 If these numbers turn 
out to be even remotely close to reality, then insurance markets will 
completely collapse except insofar as government subsidies manage to 
prop them up. 
There are several potential policy solutions to this. The most obvious 
is rate regulation. The underlying assumptions of CBO‟s estimates are 
unclear, but if they assume large industry profits, this would be a viable 
approach. If, as seems more likely, draconian premium regulation would 
simply drive insurers into bankruptcy, then regulation is not a solution. 
Second, mandate fines could be dramatically escalated. Again, however, 
fines must always be balanced: too high, and they will be either cruel or 
politically unenforceable.
229
 The third solution is, as Mantel suggests,
230
 to 
establish a low mandate floor in order to achieve cost control. If the floor 
is much, much lower than what CBO currently projects it to be, then 
premiums will be lower than projected, and the mandate will be, relatively 
speaking, more powerful. Of course, this has the effect of substantially 
undercovering the sick populations and thus undermining the solidarity 
model that is the driving force of health reform. Fourth and finally, one 
could let the markets collapse and use the resulting political energy to 
implement a new solution—perhaps a tax-financed public option, or 
 
note 64. For a family making approximately $88,200, 9.5% ($8,379) would still be a 
substantial increase over current premiums. See supra text accompanying note 219.  
228. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office, supra note 218. 
229. See Hacker, supra note 55. 
230. See Mantel, supra note 205. 
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perhaps even single-payer health care. If the subsidies continue to rise 
along with premiums, eventually the government will be paying for most 
insurance anyway. 
Assuming that none of these options are appealing to the designers of 
the bill, then there remains one option. If the mandate cannot succeed on 




Can President Obama, in Kennedy-esque fashion,
232
 motivate the 
American people to see purchase of insurance coverage as a civic duty? It 
seems unlikely. Professors David Hyman and Mark Hall observe that 
“Commentators wax poetic about the social role of health insurance, and 
treat the decision to offer and purchase such coverage in morally weighted 
terms. However, the evidence is fairly clear that potential subscribers 
approach coverage decisions in traditional economic terms.”233 Can the 
President motivate Americans to see insurance as something more than an 
economic transaction? Can he persuade citizens that high premiums—
much higher than any benefit a healthy person could expect to reap—are a 
necessary part of social solidarity? 
His addresses to the America people, thus far, have not attempted this. 
He has appealed to individual responsibility to purchase insurance, but 
only such insurance as would cover a citizen‟s own costs: 
[E]ven if we provide these affordable options, there may be those—
especially the young and the healthy—who still want to take the risk 
and go without coverage. . . . The problem is, such irresponsible 
behavior costs all the rest of us money. If there are affordable options 
and people still don't sign up for health insurance, it means we pay for 
these people's expensive emergency room visits. . . . unless everybody 
does their part, many of the insurance reforms we seek—especially 
requiring insurance companies to cover preexisting conditions —just 
 
231. In addition to whatever spirit of solidarity our national leaders can muster, there 
is the consideration that some may wish to obey the mandate simply because it is law. 
For a more detailed discussion of “expressive law,” see Maggie Wittlin, Buckling Under 
Pressure 3 (July 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (“ . . . law affects behavior not only 
by what it does but also by what it says. By expressing social values, law is able to 
change social norms and thereby change behavior.”) 
232. Lillian Goldman Law Library, Inaugural Address of John F. Kennedy, Yale 
Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kennedy.asp (“Ask not what your 
country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.”) 
233. See Hyman and Hall, supra note 160, at 26 (emphasis added). 






President Obama here appealed to the young and the healthy to make 
sure that their own expenses were paid for—but failed to urge them to take 
a broader sense of social responsibility. Doing so might have opened the 
President to political attacks, but it might have made the bill more likely to 
succeed. More to the point, it would have been honest. In our nation, the 
lowest-spending 50% of the population incurs only 3% of medical 
expenses,
235
 and the highest-spending 5% incurs 50% of the expenses
236—
a per-person difference of more than 150-fold. It is simply incorrect for 
the President to demand that healthy individuals purchase insurance to 
prevent spillover costs to the unhealthy. 
Unfortunately for the system as a whole, CBO‟s estimates of the price 
of insurance appear to be roughly correct: they are consistent with the 
experiences of Massachusetts and New York, and they are actually 
conservative considering the underlying medical expense distribution. And 
yet we must hope against all economic sensibility that CBO‟s projection 
proves spectacularly wrong. If not, then the mandate will almost certainly 
prove inadequate, leaving health insurance to fall into the death spiral of 
Congressionally-mandated adverse selection. 
C. Expanded Access but Provider Exodus 
Even if health insurance manages to cohere, there remains another 
vital step in health delivery: doctors. “What if,” asks a physician 
recruitment firm, “nearly half of all physicians in America stopped 
practicing medicine?”237 It is a ridiculous question, as even the search firm 
acknowledges,
238
 but it is rooted in legitimate concerns. The firm, 
Medicus, reported in January that nearly one-third of physicians indicated 
 
234. See Obama, supra note 6 (emphasis added). 
235. Mark W. Stanton, The High Concentration of U.S. Health Care Expenditures, 
Agency for Healthcare Res. & Quality Research in Action, June 2006, at 1, available at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/ria19/expendria.pdf. 
236. Id. at 1. 
237. Andrea Santiago, The Medicus Firm Physician Survey: Helth Reform May Lead 
to Significant Reduction in Physician Workforce, MEDICUS FIRM, Jan. 2010, 
http://www.themedicusfirm.com/pages/medicus-media-survey-reveals-impact-health-
reform. 
238. Id. (“seems unlikely”). 
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they would leave medicine if health reform passed.
239
 As Medicus points 
out, physicians are notorious for claiming that they will leave 
medicine
240—especially in self-selected samples—and the claim has not 
historically proven true. Medicus nonetheless expresses two concerns. 
First, if even some physicians do exit medicine, this could exacerbate an 
already-projected shortage.
241
 Second, “there could be an impact in quality 
of care due to a lack of morale.”242 
And yet Medicus seems to forget about the most pressing concern of 
all: physicians may not be able to exit medicine, but many have already 
exited the business of caring for government patients and some have even 
exited the business of dealing with health insurance entirely. And so 
PPACA finds itself facing another battle: even if it successfully provides 
affordable health insurance, it may still fail at providing actual medical 
care. 
Already, many patients on Medicaid report difficulty accessing 
physicians who are willing to see them.
243
 The Wall Street Journal 
reported the story of one such 16-year old Medicaid patient with severe 
joint pain.
244
 “When we had real insurance,” said her mother, “we could 
call and come in at the drop of a hat.”245 Such stories are not isolated: a 
2006 report indicated that half of all physicians polled had either stopped 
accepting or had limited the number of new Medicaid patients. In 
Michigan, the number of doctors who saw any Medicaid patients at all fell 
from 88% in 1999 to just 64% in 2005—and many of those also cap or 
refuse to accept new Medicaid patients.
246
 The director of one of 
Michigan‟s Medicaid plans reports the difficulty: “We literally get on the 
phone with doctors and beg.”247 
 
239. Id.  
240. Id. (“Some experts point to the malpractice crisis of years ago, when many 
doctors also expressed a desire to leave medicine. Some did quit; many did not.”) 
241. Id. (“The Bureau of Labor Statistics . . . predicts a more than a 22 percent 
increase in physicians jobs” by 2018.). 
242. Id.  
243. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Note to Medicaid Patients: The Doctor Won’t See You, 
WALL ST. J., July 19, 2007, at A1 (“[W]hen Medicaid patients seek care, they often find 
themselves locked out of the medical system.”). 
244. Id.  
245. Id. (emphasis added). 
246. Id.  
247. Id. 
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The reasons for this are multiple-fold, but the most commonly 
reported reason is that Medicaid pays such low rates that most physicians 
cannot afford to care for substantial proportions of Medicaid patients.
248
 
Physicians also report that they have trouble dealing with such patients in 
private practice contexts due to administrative hassles and no-show 
patients.
249
 For concerns like these, increased funding may not actually be 
an answer. Some physicians even worry that Medicaid patients are more 
prone to the sorts of medical difficulties that can lead to malpractice 
suits.
250
 The problem has reached particularly severe levels among dental 
practices




An even more extreme version of this phenomenon involves “retainer 
care”—often referred to as “concierge medicine”—a practice setup in 
which physicians focus their attention on those willing to pay a retainer 
 
248. Id. (quoting one physician who takes Medicaid patients: “[W]e‟re the ones 
getting killed.”). 
249. Id.  
250. Kevin Sack, As Medicaid Payments Shrink, Patients Are Abandoned, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 15, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/health/policy/16medicaid.html (“She also said she 
feared being sued by Medicaid patients because they might be at higher risk for problem 
pregnancies, because of underlying health problems.”). 
251. Medicaid patients‟ lack of access to dental care has been a longstanding 
problem. The New York Times reported in 1999 that: 
Even though the vast majority of the poorest Americans, particularly children, 
are covered by Medicaid for dental care, they are not getting it. . . . Many 
dentists are reluctant to take patients on Medicaid . . . because the program 
tends to scrimp on payments and involves a pencil-breaking bureaucracy. Also, 
Medicaid patients, often with transportation and day-care problems, are much 
likelier to miss appointments. . . . Then there are what officials diplomatically 
refer to as “cultural problems.” 
Carey Goldberg, Many Dentists Won’t Fix Poor Children’s Bad Teeth, N.Y. TIMES, June 
26, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/26/us/many-dentists-won-t-fix-poor-
children-s-bad-teeth.html. See also Alex Berenson, Boom Times for Dentists, but Not for 
Teeth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007 (“[M]ost dentists want customers who can pay cash or 
have private insurance, and they do not accept Medicaid patients. As a result, publicly 
supported dental clinics have months-long waiting lists . . . In some cases, the results of 
poor dental care have been deadly.”); Jay Reeves, Ala. Dental Spat May Foreshadow 
Obama Plan Effects, ABC NEWS, April 7, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=10306026 (reporting efforts of private practice 
dentists to shut down a clinic which cares for Medicaid patients). 
252. See Reeves, supra note 251. 
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fee and drop the rest of their patients.
253
 Patients trade enhanced access for 
cash, thus providing a way for physicians to evade insurance markets 
entirely by charging relatively flat fees to a handful of wealthy patients. 
This is a critical threat to the system of cross-subsidization which 
proponents of solidarity insurance value so highly:
254
 if physicians insist 
on caring only for patients who can afford to pay large up-front fees, then 
no amount of insurance regulation will provide universal access to medical 
care. 
PPACA‟s Medicaid expansions thus depend heavily on increasing the 
ranks of the insured precisely via a method that may soon become 
irrelevant. Of course, new Medicaid coverage will prove useful for 
emergently ill patients, but the expansion also represents a potential 
exacerbation of ongoing access problems. Moreover, it is not obvious that 
low-level Exchange plans would fare any better than Medicaid. If even a 
moderate number of physicians refuses to accept these patients—either by 
insisting on other insurance plans, by shifting into retainer care, or simply 
by quitting—then the problem of the underserved will simply shift from 
insurance to physicians. And PPACA does itself no favors by proposing 
$332 billion in additional Medicare cuts,
255
 which might accelerate the 
movement of physicians into retainer arrangements. 
Congress has a few mostly unpleasant tools at its disposal. Already, 
PPACA has made retainer care more expensive, since retainer care alone 
will not satisfy the mandate. Alternatively, Congress could simply 
increase Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement while decreasing the 
hassle associated with these programs—probably the simplest, most 
effective, and most direct approach. Of course, such an increase would 
have other budgetary ramifications.
256
 
Finally, Congress could also attempt to force physicians to accept 
Medicare and Medicaid patients—not entirely preposterous, since 
 
253. See Frank Pasquale, The Three Faces of Retainer Care: Crafting a Tailored 
Regulatory Response, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL‟Y L. & ETHICS 39 (2007). 
254. Id. (stating that stratification “has already eroded the primary „end‟ of health 
insurance: subsidizing the unhealthy, unlucky, and sick. . . . Retainer care threatens to 
accelerate that process”). 
255. See supra tbl.3; but see infra Part III.D (arguing that these cuts are unlikely to 
materialize). 
256. See infra Part III.D (pointing out that PPACA would have violated statutory 
“pay-as-you-go” requirements and thus been illegal had such changes been originally 
present). 
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residency training is funded through government outlays and could 
theoretically be made contingent on some sort of reciprocity agreement.
257
 
But such a move would probably provoke severe political outcry—in fact, 
fears of precisely this immediately prompted an attempt to amend the 
Missouri state constitution. As the Missouri State Medical Association 
explained: 
SJR 25 . . . would submit to voters a constitutional amendment to 
provide that no law can compel a patient, employer, or health care 
provider to participate in any health care system. It would also provide 
that all persons and employers are free to pay directly for their health 




This legislation seems absurdly paranoid, as PPACA has no 
provisions to force providers into government plans. Moreover, the bill 
would probably be helpless to stop federal regulation anyway. And yet it 
represents a genuine concern that PPACA may force providers out of 
insurance—and that Congress may subsequently try to force them back in. 
D. Deficits: A Wink, a Nod, and the SGR 
“I said at the beginning of this thing,” President Obama reassured a St. 
Louis crowd in early March, “we would not do anything that adds to our 
deficit.”259 Specifically, he told them of the PPACA: “This plan does not 
do anything to add to the deficit.” 
CBO agrees with the President
260—and yet it seems impossible, on its 
face, to extend coverage to 32 million more Americans without increasing 
the deficit. The additional taxes generated are a relative pittance compared 
to the additional outlays. In particular, I argue here that PPACA includes 
 
257. For precisely such an advocacy, see Kevin Grumbach, Fighting Hand to Hand 
Over Physician Workforce Policy, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 13, 24 (2002) (“Medicare 
payments came with no strings attached for how many residents could be trained or in 
which specialties they would be trained.”). 
258. SENATE DEBATES FREEDOM OF HEALTH CARE ACT (Missouri State Medical 
Association Legislative Report, March 25, 2010) (on file with author). 
259. Shawn Tully, Health care: Going from Broken to Broke, FORTUNE, Mar. 12, 
2010, 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/12/news/economy/debt_health_care.fortune/index.htm. 
260. See supra Part II.D. 
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many spending cuts which Congress has no intention of actually 
implementing—and that it does so in order to make the bill appear as a 
deficit-reduction measure. 
The accounting involved would have been impossible had S. 1776 
passed in October. That bill, which proposed the elimination of 
Medicare‟s Sustainable Growth Rate formula, failed to make it out of 
cloture.
261
 The American College of Physicians (ACP) decried that failure, 
arguing that S. 1776 would have “put an end to the cycle of annual 
Medicare cuts” that the formula pretended to threaten.262 ACP President 
Joseph Stubbs argued: 
For too many years now, Congress has enacted short-term patches to 
[prevent] the SGR cuts and used misleading budget gimmicks. . . . 
There is nothing fiscally responsible about pretending that Medicare 
will save money, from cuts that Congress has no intention to let go into 




It has become an annual—and sometimes monthly264—shell game for 
Congress to use Medicare cuts to reduce the deficit, and then prevent those 
cuts from ever actually taking effect. Congress‟s most recent steps, the 
AMA reported, actually “allow[ed] an unprecedented 21% cut officially to 
take effect twice before reversing it.”265 Fortune Magazine explains the 
underlying political analysis: 
A law dating from 1987 sets strict limits on total physician payments for 
Medicare. . . . [S]ince 2002, Congress has been postponing those cuts 
and allowing modest increases in reimbursements instead. The official 
budget [CBO‟s estimate] assumes that Congress made the cuts every 
year, and hence starts with a far lower spending number. But that's 
fiction. Each year, Congress passes what it calls the “Doc Fix,” which 
 
261. Joseph W. Stubbs, President, American College of Physicians, Press Statement, 
ACP Statement on Senate Vote S. 1776, Oct. 21, 2009, available at 
http://www.acponline.org/ pressroom/s1776.htm. 
262. Id. 
263. Id.  
264. Chris Silva, Medicare Pay: SGR Fatigue, AMEDNEWS, May 3, 2010, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2010/05/03/gvsa0503.htm. 
265. Id. Silva reports that the stress is actually pushing some physicians out of 
Medicare completely, mimicking for different reasons the provider exodus from 
Medicaid. Id.; see also supra notes text accompanying notes 243-252. 
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today requires spending about $25 billion a year more than the budget 
projects. 
The House included the “Doc Fix” in the bill it presented in July, but 
not the Senate. And now it's reappeared—but in a different piece of 
legislation. The administration estimates that the Doc Fix will cost $371 
billion over 10 years. Yet the CBO doesn't talk about that cost when it 
comes to health care—because it can't. It's not in the bill it's scoring. 
"The bill has many changes in Medicare, but this is the only one Obama 
wants to do separately," says James Capretta, who served in the Office 
of Management and Budget under President George W. Bush. “It's an 
attempt to hold the official cost below $1 trillion, when it's really far 
higher.”266 
All told, Fortune argued that PPACA will increase deficits by $488 
billion.
267
 As former CBO Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin complains, “the 
budget office is required to take written legislation at face value and not 
second-guess the plausibility of what it is handed. So fantasy in, fantasy 
out.”268 His estimate is that the bill will actually increase deficits by $562 
billion—very similar to Fortune‟s estimate.269 According to Holtz-Eakin, 
the bill also ignores $114 billion in discretionary spending which is 
mandated by but not technically included in the bill
270—but, more 
importantly, Holtz-Eakin states the obvious: “Congress is likely to 
continue to regularly override scheduled cuts in payments to Medicare 
doctors.”271  
The problem is so obvious that CBO‟s report itself highlighted this as 
 
266. Tully, supra note 259. For an unpersuasive defense of this accounting 
technique, see Posting of Peter R. Orszag, Director of Office of Management and Budget, 
to White House Blog, Fiscal Realities, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/10/03/21/Fiscal-Realities (Mar. 21, 2010, 3:05PM 
EST) (protesting that “An SGR fix, however, is not in this bill—so adding its costs to the 
legislation posits a piece of legislation that doesn‟t exist.”). 
267. Id.  
268. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Opinion, The Real Arithmetic of Health Reform, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/opinion/21holtz-eakin.html. 
269. Id.  
270. Id. CBO acknowledges that these costs have been omitted and identifies them as 
being “at least $50 billion.” Letter from CBO, supra note 13. 
271. Holtz-Eakin, supra note 268. 
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a “key consideration”272 in the very same report which officially projects 
deficit reduction. Director Elmendorf points out that the SGR “has 
frequently been modified . . . to avoid reductions in those payments, and 
legislation to do so again is currently under consideration by the 
Congress.” He also expressed deep skepticism about several of the bill‟s 
other deficit reduction provisions, which “would maintain and put into 
effect a number of policies that might be difficult to sustain over a long 
time.”273 CBO points out specifically that it is unreasonable to expect 
provider reimbursements to drop over time in real terms, and that savings 
credited to as-yet-unknown ideas from the not-yet-constituted IPAB may 
never actually materialize.
274
 But CBO was instructed to score the bill as 
given, no matter how unrealistic, and it did so despite raising several 
objections. 
Even this assumes that Congress stands by other revenue-raising 
provisions, such as the mandate and the Cadillac tax, which might prove 
politically unpopular
275
 or even unconstitutional.
276
 Even certain revenue-
raising provisions, like the increase in capital gains taxes,
277
 could 
theoretically undermine revenue by deterring certain forms of taxpayer 
behavior. 
The bill could, in theory, find other offsetting cost reductions, 
particularly if its preventive care measures prove more effective than 
expected by CBO and other experts.
278
 Over a longer period of time, 
perhaps some of the pilot programs in the bill will prove effective. Dr. 
Atul Gawande suggests that there is reason for hope: 
Pick up the Senate health-care bill—yes, all 2,074 pages—and leaf 
through it. Almost half of it is devoted to programs that would test 
various ways to curb costs and increase quality. The bill is a 
hodgepodge. And it should be. . . . 
 
272. Letter from CBO, supra note 13. 
273. Id.  
274. Id.  
275. See WASH. POST, supra note 73. 
276. See Complaint, State of Florida vs. United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, supra note 53. 
277. See supra note 78 and text accompanying. 
278. Much of the bill is devoted to preventive care measures; unfortunately this Note 
has not had space to explore them. See, e.g., PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 4001-4402 
(2010). CBO appears to give very little weight to these efforts over the course of a ten-
year horizon. See Letter from CBO, supra note 13. 
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Which of these programs will work? We can‟t know. That‟s why the 
Congressional Budget Office doesn‟t credit any of them with substantial 
savings. The package relies on taxes and short-term payment cuts to 
providers in order to pay for subsidies. But, in the end, it contains a test 




Some programs could prove fruitful, but CBO expresses skepticism. 
While it argues that some of these savings could reduce long-term deficits, 
with its best estimate being “a broad range between one-quarter percent 
and one-half percent” of gross domestic product (GDP), it notes 
particularly that “[t]he imprecision of that calculation reflects the even 
greater degree of uncertainty that attends to it.”280 And, of course, this is 
“relative to those [deficits] projected under current law”—that is, it still 
includes the additional imaginary health expenditure savings associated 
with Medicare cuts.
281
 All of this analysis assumes, CBO notes dryly, “that 
all of its provisions continued to be fully implemented.”282 
All told, the bill almost certainly will not decrease short-term deficits, 
and may have troubling long-term effects as well. In fact, it appears likely 
to increase deficits by nearly half a trillion dollars over the next ten years. 
The implications of this are beyond the scope of this Note, but President 
Obama and other defenders of the bill should, at a minimum, face those 
increased deficits squarely in the public debate. 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever its eventual effects, PPACA does have one virtue: it is well-
intentioned. By illegalizing the sort of appalling behavior that the 
President described, the reform bill communicates a set of social norms 
 
279. See Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/12/14/091214fa_fact_gawande.  
280. Letter from CBO, supra note 13. GDP in 2009 was $14.1 trillion. See World 
Bank, Gross Domestic Product 2008, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/ GDP.pdf. If the 
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regarding what patients do and do not deserve. In fact, with passage 
imminent on March 20, the President described the bill as a “patient‟s bill 
of rights on steroids.”283 If the plan functions as designed, the President‟s 
description will be vaguely accurate: the package is meant to guarantee 
access to insurance, regardless of a person‟s underlying health status. 
Insurance markets will be forced to treat the sick and the healthy alike as 
costs shift from actuarially-based models into a social conception of 
solidarity. The President‟s description is a vivid metaphor, one meant to 
give hope to those locked out of our present insurance system. It gives 
rights not just to policyholders, but also to anybody who wishes to become 
a policyholder. 
Of course, the President did not intend for his description to be taken 
too literally. But one can imagine that a precise interpretation might be 
appropriate. Anabolic steroids can provide short-term enhancements in 
athletic performance, but at the cost of our own underlying dynamism. 
Eventually, steroids can cripple the system permanently and the body can 
become dependent on the very source of its ailments.
284
 Steroids, in other 
words, provide a temporary benefit at the cost of the system‟s long-term 
health. 
Whatever the President actually meant, I fear that history will prove 
his words all too accurate. He may, contrary to his own intentions, become 
a prophet. 
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